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The Democrats lost the 1929 presidential election, historians agree,
as a result of the cumulative effect of the resentments directed against.
President Woodrow Wilson by progressives, farmers, and wor.kers, the coalition that had kept him in the White House.in 1916.

I

1

Wilson· paid this price

!I

of political· damage to his presidency and his patty by giving priority to
,

world affairs. at the expense of domestic problems.

I

'

Americans .came 'to see

the President as a remote figure, absent at .the Versailles peace conference
the first six !"cinths of 1919, preoccupied upon his return with the.treaty
ratification struggle, and shielded in the White House for months following
his October stroke.

The President's aloofness from his own advisers and

his fierce partisanship gave Republicans the chance to portray his·administration as inept one-man government.

They cqnvinced voters that•Wilson

was responsible for the social and economic upheaval growing out of the
postwar readjustment process.

The Republicans returned to power

back of the anti-Wilson feeling that they helped create.

OJ).

the

A caption of a

contemporary New York World cartoon, "The GOP washed in by the waves of
'National Discontent'," captured the heart of the Democratic defeat.

r

A major cause in the. revulsion against:Wilsonianism that was ktrik~
ingly manifested' in· the 1920 election was the Pre'sident 1 s failure to deal
with inflation effectively, a factor that'has not been given sufficient
weight in existing works on the immediate past.

The effect of the European

war from 1914 .to 1916 on the American cost of living was a comparatively
I

mild 14 percent.

America's war years, however, saw inflation zoom, 39 'jler..,

3 Policies of the Treasury and the Food

cent in 1917 and 24 percent in 1918.

Administration were responsible for this devastating price surge; : The

.

I

was
Treasury's decision to finance war costs by loans rather than taxes
.
I
I

an important contributing factor for monetary expansion and conseq)lent
I

i

2
I'
The Food Administration policy of guaranteed prices well above

inflation.

prewar levels on wheat, hogs, and sugar demons tr·· ·-d that production not
i.J.

Treas;;c·;r Secretary W;LlliiJ.m McAdoo

inflation was the
first concern.
. . agency's
.
. I

·~

• .: .

and Food Administrator Herbert Hoover relied on voluntarism, exhor:'tation,
·and encouragement of private thrift and
and the

conserva~ion

instead of

hi~her

taxes

stringent price controls available in the Lever Food Control Act. The
'

g overnment did not take into consideration the problems. which their finance
{

'c

meth_.ods would raise after the war.· After the Armistice, in order
\, ... ·'.·

to meet large scale expenditures and to sell bonds to finance the federal
deficit, the Treasury was compelled to maintain its. 'easy-money
during most of 1919.

Lo

The

pol'~cy'

resulting price upturn continued virtually

without interruption until prewar prices had doubled by June

1920.

Inflation, the High Cost of Living or more familiarly HCL, was the 'major
domestic issue in 1919-1920.
Wilson's coalition., fragile at best i ,had begun. to unravel when. the .
basis for special interest orientation developed during arrl because of the
government's mobiliza":tion policies of 1917-1918. Progressives
in large part liad misgiving~ when Hilson took the nation
into war and disappointments with his abandonment of civil liberties.
Normally Republican midwest wheat farmers, enticed into the coalition by
the Farm Loan Act of. 1916,. gathered a number of grievances against ''admin-.
istration price control poJ icies.

While business profits and cotton P.rices
'

were free of controls, wheat was held at $2.20.a bushel.

Wilson's decision

to veto. a twenty cent increase accounted for their defection .from the Demo-

crats in the November 1918 Congressional el<;>ctions.

Urban workers~ on their

part, were unable to identify their interests with a Democratic party con• trolled by rural southerners.

Also, despite Wilson's support of wage increases
.
I

and creation of the War Labor Board, the· largest number of strikek in history
expressed labor's discontent with the government's stand on union~ and wages.1
The High Cost of Living, touching the welfare of every American, accelerated ,
this disintegration of the Wilson coalition and, at the same time 1, heightened
the movement toward the special interest politics of postwar America.

3

In the six months of a vacant White House, December 5, 1918, to Jtily 8,

1919, executive department heads were left to devise their own respons'es to

'
HCL agitation by a President who, defending his lengthy presence in Europe

and his reluctance. to take deflationary action, contended that no econ~mic

I

recovery was possible without world peace, and, in any case, prices probably
. I

would permanently stabilize

close to.postwar levels.

Often more cont'en1
I

tious than cooperative, departments and agencies generally worked at c;r:osspurposes that confused and angered businessmen, farmers, and workers. '
Most notable in this regard was a Commerce-Treasury plan, the Industrial
Board, approved by Wilson on February 13, to fix prices by government-'
industry agreement that broke-up in acrimonious exchange between 'secretar.ies
'
William Redfield and Carter Glass, the latter dismayed at Redfield's attempt

. a~ antitrust:

liberalization.~

·Farmer and worker spokesmen, upset by the

ab.sence of representation on the business-dominated Board, perceived tpreats
to their welfare when the Board promised to lower food prices and wages ..
"The longer government ·people fool with prices." complained Wallace's

4

Farmer, "the worse off we will be." The.executive committee of the Ameri.,of Labor
I
can Federation"-made its position clear; they would fight ·any attempt a,t
10 Recognizing the political liabilities,
wage reduction.
"··
Joe Tumulty, the President's eyes

,,

and ears in Washington, ·told··. Redfield "to ring .. down the curtain on ,this
performance· because the audience is getting awfully sick."

At Tumulty's
I

insistence, Wilson dissolved the Board on May 8.

No longer on speaking

terms with Redfield, Glass turned on Agriculture ·secretary David

.Hous~on

insisting that his "buy now" campaign was undercutting the Treasury's bond
IY

sales efforts.. Republicans were quick to criticize: the administration,

I

complaining on one occasion that the War Departments's delays' in .distributing surplus. food stocks was .a typical b1under of an inefficient adjin1

I
I
I

I
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I
I

istration, and on another, joining consumer complaints "that the government's

I
I

food relief program should pay attention to the· dangers of J;amine and a'parchy, not in Europe, but in America.13 Turning on its
tration -subs·tituted scapegoats for policy.

cri~ics,

the

ad~in~s

The ·cause of inflation, clalimed
1

'.

government officiafa, was the hoarding and profiteering of selfish busipess1

men and farmers, the excessive wage demands of disloyal workers, and th1e
. wasteful l;iuying of extravagant· consumers.

America was to be. badly gove'rned

I

I

in Wilson's last two years in office.
More· significant ·for its long-term corrosive effect on the Wilson
coalition's anxiety about UCL was the President's request cif Congress on

I

').~

January for -a billion dollar budget to enable the Grain Corporation to man~

I
age the wheat export market until June 1, 1920, the expiration date of 1the

government agreement to buy wheat at $2.26 a bushel.

The entire fabric,

of the domestic economy Herbert Hoover,- the bill '_s author, had persuaded
. the President_, depended upon using the appropriation to enable t)l.e Graiµ
I

Corporation to buy wheat at the guaranty price.

Without government control,
I

I

according to Hoover, with a hungry world bidding in the AmeriCan wheat!
market, stocks would be overdrawn, leaving the country facing shortages:
in the spring of 1919.

If that occurred, "We shall. liave an era of high;

prices, of profiteering and speculatio_n , such as we have never experiebced, 11

1+

'
I'

he warned Wilson.

I

I

The Treasury had fought the President's support.of Hoover's propos'als

!.

from their inception in late October 1918.

Determined to maintain the
I

Department's wartime domination of monetary and fiscal·policy, Secretary
tf'
I
McAdoo has"pressed Wilson to accept Treasury leadership. Cartel:

'

. .

. 1.1

Glass, his successor on December lo, advocated limited loans. to the Al ifs
.

i

for wheat purchases, and a commitment.to free i:rade principles. Contra d'·i ct li11:

I
I

!

!
t

If

5
Hoover's prediction of a world wheat shortage, Glass foresaw the addition
of abundant Canadian, Australian, and Argentine wheat to a. bumper 1919I
I

American wheat Harvest depressing the world wheat price far below Hoov;er's
"artificial" prices.

I

Freed from government intervention, tumbling wheat
.

I

I To

prices would·trigger the deflation of all food and industrial prices.

pl:otect farmers from loss, the Sec_retary recommended direct compensation to

'"

them from the billion dollar appropriation.
.

Hoover, Glass ·suspected : was

exaggerating the Bolshevist threat and overstati~g Europe's plight to impress

i?

the President with the high importance of his .role as Relief Director.

The President, back in the country on February 24, used his preseµce

t8

to move the wheat bill into law four days later.

The decision on whether

the billion dollar appropriation be used to hold wheat at the'.guarantY)
or pay farmers directly was now Wilson's t,o make.'
Glass clashed.

Again Hoover and

In a memo from Paris, Hoover reminded Wilson of the importance

of a controlled price policy both to the European.relief program and the
American economy.

He dismissed Glass's direct compensation idea as imprac-

tical; Congress; he claimed, would not have time to make an orderly disburseI

ment to fifteen million farmers before the country woulp be ·overtaken by a
"most disastrous financial collapse."

I~

I

I

Glass met with Wilson on February 26
I

to press his case.

Direct compensation, he maintained, would satisfy

~he

.government's moral obligation to farmers and the consequent cost of living
I

reduction its moral obligation to consumers.

'

"In t1me of serious and ~rowing

I
unemployment, of grave social unrest, and of definite and avowed attempts
a't social revaluation," he told the President, "to maintain now •.• by deliberate act of government an unnecessarily high price on fopd was an i
'1.0

injustice to our people."

I

No doubt taken back b.y the vehemence of GlaSs's

I
I

statement, Wilson left for Europe on March 5 without a decision on wheat.

f

I
I
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During the weeks following Wilson's return to ·Versailles, HCL developed
'

into a burning national issue.
and April.

Retail food prices rose

Postw_ar inflationary forces were at work.

/0

percent- in March.

~

With pent_-up ,Jar
.

.

I

I

profits and savings, business and consumer demand for capital and durable

.' i '
. goods, along with foreign' demand for Americ.an manufactures1 expanded n\ore

....

_

.rapidly than production. A "demand-pull" type of iriflatio_nary process was
1.1
at work. To the man-in-the-street, whatever ·the economist's explanation,
"Everything is' goitig up-food, rent, clothing, taxes.

......

fixed incomes are suffering."

No won:der people on

The White House.was deluged.with petitions

for relfef from the National Consumers teague, the National.Housewives
League, the Women's Civic Federation,
Clubs.

the General Federation of Women's

The League of Women Voters threatened Congressmen

who did n~t vote

for legislation to check food prices with loss of the League's endorsement.·
The New York State legislature wanted a National Food Commissioner, and

i-3

Wisconsin politicians-a.Federal Food Committee.· Government action not
explanation was the con·sumers' cry across the country.
Wilson's decision when it came on April 16 authorizing the Graih Carporation to use thE;> billion dollar fund to buy wheat at the guaranty damaged
extensively his relations with his constituericy'.

Wilson decided, for one

thing, that a regulated market ensured success for the food relief p_rogram.
In addition, possible collapse of the midwestern agricultural complc'x of
farmers, grain traders, millers, and bankers, he

conclud~d,· wa's a da~ger .to

the country that outweighed the hardships that inflation might caus1 ~onsumers.
Much of the bitterness this decision caused.

Wilson can be attributed to
'

his association with Hoover. Envied for his rapid rise to power during the
war, the ambitious Hoover had· created·many enemies in both parties.: In a
postwar environment envenomed by suspicion and slander of men in pubiic
I

•.'/·
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life, Hoover's integrity was attacked.

Two frequent charges were that he

had turned the Food Adminstratiori over to a grain trade clique, and ~hat he

i.r

had suppressed an FTC report of meat packer greed.

I

A move was made

'

~n

I

Congress to have the Red.Cross adminster food relief, while Secretary
I

Glass led opposition within the administration .to block the appointment
. '1-b
of Julius Barnes, a Hoover man, to head the Grain Corporation •.
The administration's wheat guaranty policy, the.work of Wilson and
Hoover, was identified in ·the public mind as the principal cause of inflation.

At its national convention in April, the president of the National

Association of HanufacturEfs asserted:

"The. cost of living is hung on the

'

peg of $2.26 wheat."

He cited a questionnaire.of 4,400 NAM members who
\. ")

agreed that "high prices were due to government decree."
the same·mind.

Labor was 9f

Under pressure from local councils, the AFL executive

committee decided at its convention in June to call for an end to "govern-

1-8
ment intervention to control prices."

The actions of wheat farmers added

to the public belief that the.administration had acted unwisely.

During

'
March and April, when prices had climbed as Grain Corporation sales i;educed
the wheat surplus, farmers added to inflation· pressures by withholding wheat

l1

from market, expecting to sell later at a crest price.
saw a lesson for the country,

A business journal

·· "The unfortunate pledge

already given to agriculture should be a warning," according to the Financial

I

.and Commercial Chronicle," of the ungrateful re~ponse .the country shfuld
expect from any economic group receiving special privileges from the»

;a
government."

Sensitive to the political·harm.of .these developments,·

_Joe Tumulty cabled his concerns to the President on May 12. ''The
issue of HCL acute. Wheat is the keystone in the arch of high pricesl"
. While the.guaranty, it was widely believed was considered
a major inflation factor, .,

~I

8

I

strikes and the meat paclcers were also thought to be HCL props.
Strike seemed end.emic in America in 1919; four million
workers had walked off their jobs;
struck in September.

the entire Boston police force

Not only were these radical-led unions pushing

. up the cost of living with exhorbitant wage d.emands, but so was the
meat packer monopoly.' the "Food Trust".

"Is the day approaching,"

the New York Times asked, "when people must eat out of the hands of the

·sv

Chicago packers, or .starve?"

..

Again with his .~r to the. ground,

Tumulty on June 30 urged Wison to move the government against the packers.
Public unrest over high prices mounted;.
A farm journal claimed:

the President was the target,

"The subject most talked about in the United

States today is not war, not .the League of Nations, not who will be
next president.
cabled Wilson:

It is prices."

rvOn

June 27, Massachusetts legislators

The citizens of the· United States want you home to

reduce the high cost of living which we consider far more important than
3{
the League of Nations;" Republicar;r.began asking why the government
was failing to enforce the anti-profiteering s.ections of the '.Lever'

ActJ~

On July 8, .treaty in hand, the President returned to Wash~ngton
to find the n'ation alarmeq to the point of hysteria over the surging 'rise
·of consumer prices. Continued inaction on ·the'. HCL issue, the President
knew, was political dynamite.
Deciding to take Tumulty's advice, the President initiated
action against the packers.

On July 11, he released a Federal Trade;
'

Commission. report that ·:desc;ribed"an .approach of.'.-packer domination oil all

n

. important foods in the country." On Wilson's ord~rs, .the Attorney
A. Mitchell PalJUer,
·
General on August .s, instructed District Attorneys. to enforce· rigidly· the
)
.
'

"

penal sections of the Lever Act as part of "a country-wide campaign ,

,,3r

against hoarders and profiteers.

. I
The next day.the antitrust divisi~n

filed suit against the packers for unlawful re:straint of .trade.

3

~

33

9

In responding ·to .an issue he had pushed. aside for months,
Wilson may have n6t gone beyond these. actions if it Had not been
brought home to him

that the HCL controversy was, endanger.ing -support'
.
ina~tention.

for the tre_aty .. Publie·:resentment about government

. Ii

to HCL, his Cabinet told him on July 28, was being transferred to
.
..i.o
-ratification of the treaty. The next day, Homer Cummings, National
Chairman of the Democratic party, reported toTUmulty the results of
survey of
his Midwest and Pacific coast"political attitudes. "The p.~ople were

1

far more concerned with the in.er.ease in the cost of living than in
the debate in the Senate over the League.
against

HCL .wouici jeopardize the

agreed.

"For Wilson to delay action

.

fl

treaty,'~ the. chairinan warned. William McAdoo

"The people here are more concerned with:,domestic questicins

than the League Covenant," he told Wilson. "The high cost of living, .taxation,
the railroad issue and the.general unrest are occupying the thoughts.
of everybody to a much greater degree than international problems."
In .his report, Cummings, as chief political strategist, went
beyond the fate of treaty to the fate of the party.
dential rac.e was on his mind.
remark of

hi~

'f 3

He had take.n seriously the earlier

Republican counterpart, Will Hays, that the H$L crisis was an

oppo.r-tunity to alienate
allegiance.

-The 1920 presi-

workers and farmers from their 1916 Democratic

Cummings saw it happening he had told Tumulty on July 14,
1

not by. Republican action but Democratic inaction ... Farmers .were convinced,

"'V

he said, that the adminstration was not protecting their interests. '
Two lfeeks later he repeated this ·warning to .the President:

labor

and farm groups were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the
.

If{"

Democratic party ·leadership.He, as did others, advised Wils.on, to 'ltct·
before the Republicans seized the issue.

Vlo
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I
I

These pressures forced the President to pay full attention. to HCL.
I
In a rush of events, he reviewed the wheat market with Wheat Directo~
on July 30
J ·
Barnes who assured him that the Grain Corporation could hold the guaranty

•

.

"l1

and at the same time feed Europe.

.

.

.

I

.

.

Later. that .day Railroa,d Adminis):raJtor

Walker Hines and Head of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers·Warren
. .
I
'1
Stone were in the Oval Office to discuss government reaction to the decision of the Railway Wage Board on July 11 not to sanction P'!Y

rais,es~

The unions had threatened a nation-wide rail strike unless the gove;rnment
I

granted their wage demands.

To head off a strike, Hines and Stone .~ro1

posed to Wilson that, in re.turn for a 90-day no-strike pledge frcim the
I

1.

nninns. th" President commit the government to .stein inflation. withi!f 'that time,
Wilson's agreeement tied solution of the railroad wage question·to the
success of· the HCL campaign. The next day the President ordered At~orney

,

··n

General Mitchell Palmer to organize an anti-inflation campaign.

.

I
I

.

At.a

meeting of exect1tive department officials that afternoon in Palmer's
office, Hines, Leffingwell, and William Colver, chairman of the Federal

Jo On

Trade Commission, agreed to_ draw up a plan.
to his Cabinet

"a

August 1, Wilson an~ounc.ed

comprehensive program attacking the high cost of.living

'
l

all along the line by ·way of the law of enforcement and the law of suggestion" _was

Ir
underway. The

1

"Committee of Three" -recommendations were

l

that the.Justice Department and the Federal Tra.de Commission work "ip.
.

:I

'

tandem to halt profiteering, and that the wheat guaranty be abandoned.
Anticipating Tumulty and Leffingwell lobbying of

.

.

Wfl~on,

-w1th the President, -and Hoover sent him two cables.

J V'

Barnes metl twice

.

.I

Europe is being
_, fed

J .3:

and the wheat market is strong was the essence of their argumen·t._

'
Utilizing a parliamentary, device, the joint session,· that had ·frequently
I
,,

I

•

filled bis need for political theatre since his days as New Jersey governor,
Wilson stood before both houses of Congress for th_e l_ast; time on August 8

'/Fi'

'

.
11
I

to dramatize his HCL campaign.

I

First announcing that the wheat guaranty

I

objectives were being met, he went on to describe hoarding ;;md profiteering
as the major causes of in.flation.
Department was

I .
. I
the meg.t lackers;

Wilson promis·ed action;

th~

·initiating : ant.itrust prosecution against

Justice·

the Feqeral
I

Trade Commission was investigating price· fixing in the food and· .clothing
industries.

He asked for emergency powers under the Lever Food Conttol
.
I

Act, funds for additional Justice Department personnel, and authoritt to

I
I .

supervise the business community in order to prevent hoarding and speculation.
Wilson 'tied the. HCL issue to treaty ratification.
world affairs, he claimed:

·HCL was rooted in! unset.tled
I

"There can be no settled conditions herei.or

.

r~

elsewhere until the treaty of peace is out of the way.; •. "
Wil.son' s pledge did not pa~ify his raiil road employees.
the union brotherhoods, voted'. to strike.
down.

i

I

On Augu$t 27;

Palmer urged Wilson not to!back

"Concessions," said Palmer, "would utterly crush the· campaign."

.r.l

In his Labor Day message, Wilson promised wage adjustments for ra'ilroad
workers if the campaign against inflation

failed.

f' For

the ·administration,

I

.

the quarrel with its own employees was an embarra·ssment as well as a1source
I
.I .
_of estrangement with the labor movement. The International Ladies Garment
Workers

asked.:

I

"How can cine advise· workers to wait in the dim bopel that
I

I

'HCL will come down?
Wilson had put
. the.

Who can say that high prices are at the.ir peak?]'
iss~e
.

behind him.

J"'

But

Again absorbed in the treaty, he

I

commenced his Western tour for treaty ratification on September 3.

His
I

reference to·inflation at St. Paul was his only public statement on the
inflation iss.ue· for the remainder 'of 1919.

The HCL campaign was no1 in

·hands of Attorney General Palmer.

I

·Palmer applied to the campaign what the President had called "the
law of enforcement and the law of suggestion," that is,

th~ coer~ivel powers
I

12

emo~ion

of the Lever Act and the organized.propaganda techniques to arouse

I

against profiteers that the Treasury and the Food Administration ha:d used·
I

during the war to sell bonds and conserve food.

I

Like McAdoo and Hoover,

·Palmer attempted. to promote voluntary cooperation through. the ballyhoo ·of .
j"8
.
noisy· demonstrations and appeals to patriotism. But the Attorney General
wen t t o excess.

',.

I

• .
h'is· a11t1.· Re d 'd rive.
.
an cl
Th a t Sep t em.b er h e 'tV'as organizing

' .

.

used the same doomsday t·one in the HCL campaign that lie used· in

.

to rid the country of Bolshevists.

.pledgih~

.

I

The two campaigns had the same·obj¢ctive,
I

he declared, namely' to check every menace to American .instft'utions
. both Bolshevism and HCL ·were dan.gers to the national interest."

"b~cause

If thl HCL

campaign were not won, he warned, the!). "wlien the scant-dark days of wilter
come ••• we will see starvation wa'lk the streets of our cities and hand ffn
.

l

ft

hand with starvation will come another menace of which I need not spea;k." .
Both campaigns shared Palmer's proclivities for rai~s, use of violetice,
!
... and restrictions on free speech.

I

Palmer also used the gove~nment's coercive powers to a greater dtgree·
than the. Food.Administration had during the·war.

He appointed H~ward Figg,

a Kansas lawye~, to head the HCL division with orders to cooperate with

.

I

the FBI and the FTC in amassing evidence of profiteering for prosecut~on

.

bI)

under the Sherman and Clayton antitrust laws and the Lever Act·.
.

i

.

Paliper
I

also revived the Food Administration's wartime fair price committee system,
~I

again with a difference.

The.Fo'od Administration had appealed to patriotism
I

to encourage cooperation; Palmer favored intimidation to expose profi,teers.
The evidence in profiteering cases was gathered.through ·a complaint
card system that draw thousands of women into the campaign.

Palmer appealed

to them to join his .cr~sade "to save America through an example of wi.se

.

.

I

spending and frugal living"; otherwise, he maintained, "the country was
~y

.

1

headed toward social and economic ·disaster." ·The New York Times foresaw

.

.

a Palmer-organized :'·'.Housewives Brigade,

I

11

fifty thousand strong, complaint

.,

13
cards in hand, marching through the shops of the city, checking prj.c_es, and

.

~3

reporting profi.teers.
country responded.

In fact, ten times fifty thousand women _across the

In Alabama, women organized Patchem and Wearem

cl~bs.

i
A clothing conservation drive was launched in Kansas to popularize l1oke
I

dressmaldt\g ·and sewing.

Women in Georgia and Nebraska, Minnesota and,' Maine

began groups such as Crusaders Against HCL, Buy Right Club, and Buyers
Vigilance Committee.

The Lower Cost of Living Club members in New'Hampshire

recited. while shopping:

'

"To market, to market/ to ·buy a fat pig/Home, again,

home again/The price is too big."

\, +

The Justi.ce Department sent invitations to 183 women.' s organizations
to cooperate.

Among the more influential responding were the Nationdl

Consumers League, General Federation of Women's Clubs, and the League of
Women Voters.

At their meetings, club members were requested to pledge

to . ' 1(1 teach mo.re production,· nun.·e cons·eTVq'.tio)l," moYe resporis:lliility to
Government.

2) Teach.English, preach our form of government.

tages of our laws.

3) Root out agitators.

Show advan-

Instill in the htbor class the

fdf
11

thought that agitators should not be feared or tolerated.
Palmer-style
voluntary cooperati.on, laced with a strong nativist atti tu•.i"', suspicion of
the foreign-born, arid distrust of worker patriotism, was: a. .cause of postwar
war hysteria. tha.t has been overlooked.
The feminist movement, .then at its height, partially accounts for the

-tk

-

enthusiatic participation.of women in,HCL campaign.
a more equitable society.
this sentiment best:

Activists dreamed of .

Perhaps General Federation Magazine expressed

"The women who fought for prohibition and got it,

'

'

for suffrage and have it so nearly, for protection of our children and
have the child labor law, for the protection of women in industry and have
the maximum and minimum wage law, can get what they want in this country.
And i f they want to reduce the high cost of living and catch the profiteer,

t.A''l1.·

"(lff':) -

I!

,:;-7-1
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!
they can do it if they ,;ill."
The diligenc.e of ·women enabled Palmer 1 s agents to catch and prosecute

I
170 alleged profiteering retailers.

Hoarders were exposed; after 86 f9od

warehouse raids, Figg an1'ounced his "flying squadrons" had confiscated huge

I

amounts of butter, meat,. beans, and ten million dozen eggs.p Despite the
energy exjiended and the booty captured, prices. continued to climb.
'
Republican press and politicians professed cynicism of the intentions

.of the administration whirlwind.

William Allen White,·the Kansas aaJe,
I

suspected that much.of ·the raiding was done to stabilize the ballot for the

r, r

·Democratic party rather than ·the market for consumers.

.

"American people,"
I'

the New York Tribune sneered, "can be quieted .by buncombe and l?Y the \parade

'11

of quack remedies if garnished with ·noise and loud promises."

:·

Henry 1Cabot
I
I

. Lodge cha.rged that Wilson wa.s using the HCL crisis to coerce the Senate into

10

.

entering the League on the President's terms.

hi.

The postwar partisans ip in

'

1919 had first erupted.with Republican demands for a· special sess.ion •of the·

66th Congress they would control with the intention of forcing Wilso~ into
a fore:tin policy partnership.

Tumulty saw opportunity for Wilson in agree'I
ment; a con.ciliatory response, would disarm his opponents, he believed,
·1

and also demonstrate presidential leadership to a business community 'upset

11
by a sluggish economy.

I

Tumuity was not alone amo.ng De~ocrats who cori'.sidered.
'

Wilson's _aggressiveness toward .Republicans a mistake.

Colonel House was of

this opinion, but judged Wilson's attitude that of a man "accustomed to

1Y
dictatorial ways which are hard to give up."

'
In an angry exchange with
I

·Republican leaders on February 28, Wilson told them he would not cal] a

11

session until his r;.tum from Europe with the completed treaty.

I

.

In r etalia:1

tion, a Republican filibuster on the last day of the lame-duck 65th C.ongress,

I ..

March 4, prevented passage of appropriation bills that eventually forred

I

.

15

1'1-

Wilson to open a special session on May 19.

Adding the 1920 presidential

election maneuvering to Republican provocations and Wilson obstinacy

poli·~.

ticized the UCL.issue.
Clearly, it was to be up hill from the start for a HCL campaign
managed by a Democratic executive department that needed the cooperati:on of
l

a Republican-controlled Congress"

Palmer requested the Senate ·committee

on Agriculture to add food marketing cooperatives and clothing retailers

.

tf The

to the anti-profiteering sections of the Lever Act.
ready a prime Justice Department target.·

former were al.,-

On August 12, a federal

district court found the New York.State Milk Producers Association guilty
1~

of combining to raise milk prices.

.

Indictments against dairy cooperatives

in Chicago and Cleveland brought angry charges at committee. hearings by
the milk producers group and the National Board of Farm Organizations that
Figg' s men, breaking into their ·off.ices with drawn guns. had roughed up

17

employees. Wallace's Farmer described the raids as part of "The Game of
Swatting Farmers," who "got a raw deal during the war, and now were being
1~

. treated worse than ever;..,

The Agriculture Committee promptly eXcluded

cooperatives from prosecution, while leisurely delaying until December

. .

11

before giving ·Palmer authority. to prosecute clothing retailers.

Not. having

the.political clout of a farm bloc, clothing trade associations vainly protested their. liability to fines and jail terms •

fO

. Palmer had as much difficulty with Democrats as with Republicans.

The

Cab·inet' never in tull agreeu1t:1rl:. U!l l11.r1a-tio11 .causes' refused to uni tc

behind a politically ambitious Attorney Genera1f'IThe President also created
a serious problem for the campaign's success.

16
when, after consultation with Russell Leffingwell of the Treasury,· hJ was
I

persuaded that bringing the packers to court was a mistake. "No judicious
.
.
student of the problem," in Leffingwell' s opinion, "believes that HCL will

rv

;

be materially affected by the pr·osecution of the packers." More to the point,
such an attack on the business, community might well .jeopardize the TJeasury' s

.

I

.

reliance on private investment to provide credits for European recoqstruction,
. I
I
he reminded Wilson; American prosperity depended upon a healthy Eurqpean

f·$
market •. In September. Wilson instructed
Tumulty to.advise Palmer to negotiate with packer representatives for an outSl!

of-court settlement. Sometime after the President's stroke in early' October,

t.s'

Tumulty reminded Palm.er of thes.e instructions.

'

On October 28 1 Palmer: re~

:p.C:u:ted :to the Cabinet that "the Packers wished to come in and agree to give

.

fl,

up wholesale and .retail grocery business, and etc. , if ·not indicted.
consent decree was disclosed on December 18'.

f1

11

~

'

The

The deal with the packefS

severely undercut the HCL campaign.
From then on, the campaign labored under the public 1 s conviction that
the administration was "jailing the small profiteer but leaving the mechanism

H
of profi_teering untouched."

Progressives were disappointed.

Amos Pinchot

'

askei!, "Are there different laws for ·swindlers rich and swindlers poor? '

~i

The League of Women Voters described the campaign "as a pretentious ~tt'ack
upon profiteers, a sham battle put up by the President, Congress, the, Depart-

. '

tfb

ment of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission."
joined in condemnation of the consent decree.

Labor and farm groups

To the International Ladies

Garment Workers it was "a government sell-out· to business," while Wallace's·
... -... ~~

Farmer asked why the packers had not been placed "un'dei: government super! 'l 1
vision and compelled tci use their big machine in the public interest
The

i"

HCL campaign never regained the credibility it had lost with the consent

I

decree. \ton top of a 14 percent· cost of living increase in 1919, ··inflation

I

exploded in the first half of 1920, rising at.an annual rate of 24 percent.

1.

9".-

Retail food prices on June 1 were 120 percent higher than before the'war.

17

The people blamed farmer greed, union wage demands, and. business profiteering,
accusations that s.et the special interest groups at odds not only with each
other but with the administration. In turn, among business, labor, f'armer
there existed animosity which arose. f'rom the heightened special interest
orientation of' each of'. these groups.
Fears that th.e HCL campaign was attacking their interests. contributed·
to the trend of farm. groups to consolidate into national organizations, and
set up a Washington base from which to lobby Congress.

The National Board

of Farm Organizations and the Farmers National Council were active in the
halls of Congress early in 1919; in November, the American Farm Bureau ·Federation was organized and its presence in Washington quickly felt.

11

summer the Senate Farm Bloc was formed.
Capper of Kansas who launched
over HCL.

a long

Amcng

That

its organizers was Arthur

career on the wave of farm agit ation.

"Every class is organized for self gain," he asserted.

complete' organization in the

futur'.~,

".

"Without

without ability and courage to act,

agriculture is going to be robbed of the just fruits of its labor,"

'¥

No farm organization or journal called for cooperation with Palmer.
Instead, the administration's· efforts was subjected to ridi.cule,

To the

National Grange Monthly, the campa_ign was a "r?aring farce in the midst
. of increasing chaos and gloom invariably ending in a denunciation of pro-

~f
fiteering farmers."

The Corn Belt Meat Producers Association president

·declared that the HCL drive was fleecing farmers "out of hundreds of" millions
q~

of dollars.''

The more embattled farmers became the more tense their rela·-

tions with other economic groups.

Senator Capper was in the forefront of

those who charg~d the business community with responsibility for inflation.

I

He called for Republicans to support Palmer's prosecutions of retailer~ who,
in turn, charged that the Farm Bloc was a source of misinformation on

infla·~

I

tion causes that was .detrimental to business interests and demanded that

.

Capper end his business-baiting.

q7
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The farm-business antagonism generated during the crisis did not:' approach the. intens:i,ty of the antipathy displayed between agriculture and
labor.

Taking advantage of the anti-union sentiment in the country in the

'

fall of 1919 during the great labor-management struggles over unionis~ and
I

wages, farm groups attempted to shift the onus for·HCL to organized i!abor.
I

The unions had. no right to strike, declared the Missouri Farmers' Assoc.,,-,·

'IS ,

iation, during the great national distress of HCL.

.

Using the brush of de.-

famation, the recently-formed i'iaerican Farm Bureau Federation was not alone
in its resolution urging labor to rid its ranks of Bolshevists and join the
farm bureaus in their "unwavering faith in and full support of the Consti-

.

.

tution of the United States."

~q

In metropolitan ar.eas, where food prices

were 20 percent higher than the national average,·people were convinced that
/ lf'J

inflation was bottomed on.farmer greed.
of Canner's Farmer:

A veiled threat was the reaction

"Faithful farmers who always produce sufficient, food

for all had about reached the limit

of their patience with city workers."
1•, I
Rural-urban tensions increased through tpe HCL period ..
In January 1920, to stimulate the sagging fortunes of the campaign,
Palmer .Put the labor movement under sie.ge. He ordered an attack on .labor
/OY
as the prime cause of HCL. Speakers were instructed to argue: "As the union
demands for more pay and shorter hours is granted, production declines,·

a shortage of

-·

goods results' and like a skyrocket, up go prices to new levels ..

Prices mount to staggering figures and the cry of· our

~orkers

pay and shorter hours- and u.p go the pric".s another notch.

is for more

Must this vicious

l c,3

circle continue?" At their. conv:ention in February, the Wor;11en' s Trade Union
League protested: "Be it resolved that we asli the Denartment ·of Justice that
its propaganda be stopped at once.
that this entir~ anti-union propaganda
.
'
be re_.pudiated by the government." abor was angry, and rightly s9; labor's
wage demands .were a desperate effort to keep up with prices that had spiraled
under goverrm11mt policies.
·
;

,."i

I
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I

"lf The business

!I
community, on its part, highly incensed with the Presic!ent 's

claim that profiteering businessmen were responsible for inflation, were
worr,ied about the .consequences of Lever Act prosecutions.

Trade

iations, among 'them the National Electric Light Association· and
National Petroleum Association, expressed worry that·if people were:convinced that profiteering was causing inflation, theY. will encourage; ~s
the National Association of Manufacturers expressed it, "public officers
,~
.
.
.
to snoop into: one's business." The business, community wanted no·

thr.eats

fr!!l!n the government to its freedom of economic decision-making.

""

Business· pressure had its effect on the government.

for a truce.

'

I

Palmer. signaled
'

1ob

At meetings early in 1920 with clothing trade associations,

Figg agreed that the government in making the r.etailer the· scapegoat' had
"

undermined public confidence in business.

The government had,,he skid,
I

.

"the bigger job in hand to save business than to satisfy public or labor
101

interests."
Judging Figg's statement a sign of government weakness, retail ·trade
associations were emboldened to defy federal authorities.

In New York

city, clothing store merchants heckled and refused to cooperate with in-

l ';;'
. vestigators·.

In Alexandria, Virginia, a sugar wholesaler denied agents

access to his accounts.

His chamber of commerce, he claimed, had advised

'~~

"

members not to give information . . Few indictments were obtained, ac,cording
to a Department report, because "grand juries refused to indict especially
I

flO
when jurymen were engaged in coirunercial activity .n
tecting their own·.

.

I

Businessmen wer'e proI
I

Federal court judg.es agreed with defendants who! argued

that-the Lever Act, in declaring i t _unlawful "for any person wilfU:llly

I

to exact excessive prices of necessaries,

11

I

failed to define a reaso,nable
.

profit.

I

In a Spokane, Washington· case, the judge said the meaning fof

"excessive" was uncerta.in because, "prices could not be. fixe_d arbiJrarily

.

·without reference to place and circumstances.

111

11

i

In St. Louis, the judge

i 20
I

dismissed a sugar profiteering case on the grounds that .the Lever Act
was "so vague and indefinite in- the definition of the crime as to lie in
contravention of the sixth amendment • . .

which states that 'In all

criminal. prosecutions, the accused shall ... be informed of the nJture
I
\ flY
'
of the accusation." Having won only 29 of 517 cases in the lower courts,
I
/I]

I

the Justice Department appealed ten Lever cases to the Supreme Court.

'

.

It was evident by early summer that government profiteering prosecutions were st.alled.
Another wea.pon in. the HCL campaign was ineffectual.
committee concept did not work for a· number of reas·ons.

The fair price
In August, 1919,. at

the"beginning of the campaign, the National Conference of Governors pledged
to establish state price commissions to organize and oversee community
committees.

Nine governors, including those.of California, Connecticut, and
11

Ohio, states crucial to Palmer 1 s success, did not fulfill their promises: o/.
Considering the effort useless, Philadelphia and Cincinnati newspap~rs

st~pped

running fair price food lists • Several judges', moreover, r~led t.hat
·
·
·
ha d no price-setting
·
'
. i /b Russe
. . 11 Le ff:.ingwe 11
aut hority.
f air price committees
115

of the Treasury, who claimed Palmer was· never authorized to organize these
committees, put his finger on the most serious problem:

the fair·price

committees were not disposed to fight influential local merchants.

For this

reason,. he said, "I am very much afraid that the committees are now func.

'.

/

tioning . . • to stabilize prices at a high level." .. This situation frustrated Figg. It was impossible to win price reductions from
clothing retailers, he stated in his final report,· because they controlled
the fair price committees.

He cited the case in New York City where the

president of B. Altman's, a large department store, was the committee
chairman •. In order to avoid chaos in the industry, the chairman, Michael
Friedman, informed Figg,

only prices set by his committee

woul~

be

accepted by .the industr/t'rin challenging the government, organized business
and established groups by means of
price committee defiance

tra~associatton

i

fair
legal blocks and
I

were defeating public policy.

21
· of farmers and workers.
While Figg' s agents continued to aggravate the special interests. through
the 1920 summer, signs of .the campaign's disintegration were appearing,
Wilson government was beginning to break up.
and Hines had resigned.

The

By May, Glass, Leffingwell,

Wilson's failure to recognize Figg's name in a

progress report from Palmer was. a measure of the President's interest .in

1lq '
the campaign. · In July, Wilson, signalling .the end of the campaign, approved
a Railroad Labor Board wage increase to all employees effective August .l,
and retroactive to May l.· "Another nail in the coffin of the hopes that
I l.r;,
the cost of living will fall," remarked the New York World.· But HCL had.
started to weaken by this time .. Government spending decreases and subsequent
Federal Reserve credit tightening had balanced the.budget by the fall of

1919, a·disinflation process that worked through the economy to bring food
. ,
. f lo I
.Pric·es in July down 2 percent.

The Republican and Democratic platfdnns of their June conventions·
revealed the campaign strategy each planned 'in order to shift to the other
responsibility for HCL.

Democratic bungling of HCL, the Republicans.

charged, was evidence of the administration's ineptitude; lack of leadership., and of intelligent planning.

If the administration had enforced

_the anti-profi.teering laws enacted by a Republican Congress, inflation
would have ended.

Instead, the Democrats had used the Lever Act ·"to continue

,......

its arbitrary and inquisitorial control of the life of the people in time
of peace and to _carry confusion into industrial life."

During the campaign,

Republicans carefully nurtured the belief.that HCL was the result of Demo-

cratic mismanagement. In June, the House Judiciary Committee called for
Palmer's resignation, alleging that he had been part of' a sugar price-rigging
scheme. A SenaUsubcommittee investigating presidential campaign I·expendi.
tures in July heard charges th.at the St. Louis HCL office had be~n 'promoting
Palmer's candidacy. The Attorney General, the committee charged, :was guilty
of misusing HCL fundt1:'"~By such political tactics, the Republicans contrived
to escape blame for the fai.lure of their Congress to meet its responsibilities
in the H91 crisis.
·

22.

On the def'ensive, not reco0azing that d:isinf'lation was lt
work, the Democrats denied that Republic~ns had been.cooper~ti;e·i To
the contrary, they claimed, the Congressional Republican··maJorityl had·
· "raged against prof'iteering and the
·
high ccist of' living wi:thout enacting a single statute to make the ,f'ormer

'

I

af'raid or doing a single act to bring the latter within limitations." The

.

.

I

platf'orm def'ended the administration's long-held contention that the-f'irst

s~ep. toward American economic· recovery was

ratif'ication of' the

membership in the League. Not perceiving these ties, the

·tr~aty and

Democrat~

charged,

I

;'The Republican ·party is responsible f'or the f'ailure to· restore p2.ace con1

ditons in Europe., which is a principal cause of' post-armistice itlf'lation
II·'\I
the world over." The Democratic campaigners, however, seldom raised the HCL
issue.
I

.

.

'

Bef'ore their convention open_ed. on June 28, Democrats knew the. prob-

i

·.

lem to overcome was

"the complex but irresistible
I
disgust" of' Wilsonianism aroused by the· President's "quixotic excJ.rsions" to

p.f

'

.

Europe, and his "one-man government.. '.' Hoping to hold progressives and 1·,orkers'
the f'arm vote was written of'f'- in ·the party, they nominated James 'cox bedaus e
he was not closely associated with Wilson.

If' any doubts reciained of'

Wilson's liability to the party, reports of' Steve Early, Franklin°D. Roosevelt's
advance man, dispelled them. Working across ·the northwest f'rom Minneapolis,
Sioux Falls, Butte, Seattle, Spokane, to ~~\3-~~' Early describet the.bitterness, the .antipathy
against Wilson pe·rsonallyn "evident everywhere~and deeply
.
:booted". People, he f'ound, were

'I

disinterested and uninf'ormed abovt the League

of' Nations. Most wanted to kno;i "what they are going to get. thinking close.
to home, their bread baskets and not

o:l>th~i:t

allies". The problel)l f'or the

Democrats, prevalent everywhere, reinf'orced by the candidates me~ting
Wilson in 'the White House on July l8, was the general impression! · .

..

.

. .

I.

.

that Wilson confa·olled ·cox. "If' people could be told that Wilson had stepped
aside, it would mean a lot of'

.

.

·.

vot~s.

As things stand, in their

·

min~s-

11-0 I

Cox

·will, if' elected_, merely continue the Wilson administration." The bemocratic.

.
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campaigners were too supportive of Wilson's foreign policy to follow
Early's strate[\y. Although prices sank 24 perce~t between JuiLy and electiOJ:\
day, the deflation was not enough to erase peoples! memories· of the.HCL
campaign's aggravations ..and failure. The burden of Wilson.ianism, tpe sum.
of the administration's failures to deal with postwar social, economic,
and racial unrest, was too heavy for Cox and Roosevelt to bear. Of these
problems, inflation, threatening every American's welfare, was most destructive of. the Wilson coalition. This was not the only significance of
the HCL. controversy on politics.
conten~

The administration, trapped between the millstones of the

.1

ding interest groups, had antagonized each in its fruitless attempt to a:p-_
pease consumer demands for cost of living reductions. The pressures. that the
.

.'

..

administration was subject to in the HCL months from organized interest groups,
business,

agr~culture,

and to a lesser degree, unions, began during the war

mobilization years. This development quickened. during the HCL experience when
economic groups, lessening their reliance on the government's ability to protect the general welfare, turned to intensive lobbying.of the White House and
Congressional committees to. advance their special interests. A decade before
the labor movement joined them, trade associations and the farm bloc had
shaped the modern political structure of special interest politics.
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